Passive scheme with a photon-number-resolving detector for monitoring
  the untrusted source in a plug-and-play quantum-key-distribution system by Xu, Bingjie et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
2.
01
96
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  8
 O
ct 
20
10
Passive scheme with photon-number-resolving detector for monitoring the untrusted source in
Plug-and-Play quantum key distribution system
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School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871, PR China
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A passive scheme with a beam splitter and a photon-number-resolving (PNR) detector is proposed to verify
the photon statistics of an untrusted source in a plug-and-play quantum-key-distribution system by applying a
three-intensity decoy-state protocol. The practical issues due to statistical fluctuation and detection noise are
analyzed. The simulation results show that the scheme can work efficiently when the total number of optical
pulses sent from Alice to Bob is above 108, and the dark count rate of the PNR detector is below 0.5 counts/pulse,
which is realizable with current techniques. Furthermore, we propose a practical realization of the PNR detector
with a variable optical attenuator combined with a threshold detector.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the BB84 protocol [1], the security analysis
for the practical quantum-key-distribution (QKD) source was
given [2, 3]. Further, the decoy-state protocol was pro-
posed [4] and was developed [5–10] to improve the QKD per-
formance. Commonly, a trusted QKD source is considered
for those protocols, which means the photon-number distribu-
tion (PND) of the source is fixed and is known by Alice and
Bob. However, this assumption is not always valid in prac-
tice. For example, the intensity fluctuation from the source
and the parameter fluctuation from the optical devices cause
the assumption of the trusted source to fail [11]. In particular,
an untrusted source exists in a real-life experiment (i.e., two-
way plug-and-play system) and gives rise to the possibility of
a Trojan-horse attack [12–16], where the source is pessimisti-
cally controlled by Eve. Thus, the statistical characteristics of
the QKD source need to be verified to boost the QKD perfor-
mance [12–26].
Intuitively, if the characteristics of the untrusted source in-
finitely approaches that of the trusted source, Alice needs
a quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement [27] to ver-
ify the PND of the QKD source. However, it is hard to
implement the QND measurement in practice. Fortunately,
an analytical method was provided to calculate the final key
rate when the probability of untagged bits was known by
Alice and Bob [13], and an active photon-number-analyzer
(PNA) scheme was proposed to monitor the probability of un-
tagged bits. However, it is challenging to implement the ac-
tive scheme, where a high speed random optical switch and
a perfect intensity monitor are needed. Then, using inverse-
Bernoulli transformation, a passive scheme, with a beam split-
ter (BS) and an imperfect detector, was proposed and was
verified experimentally [14]. Furthermore, to realize the pas-
sive scheme more efficiently, a high-speed two-threshold de-
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tection can be used without applying inverse-Bernoulli trans-
formation postprocessing [15, 16]. From another viewpoint,
recent results for the three-intensity decoy-state protocol with
the untrusted source have rigorously proved that it is suffi-
cient to monitor the lower and upper bounds of the probabil-
ity for Alice to send out vacuum, one photon, and two photon
states [19, 20]. More recently, the detector-decoy scheme was
theoretically proposed to monitor the PND of an untrusted
source using a threshold detector combined with a variable
optical attenuator (VOA) [22].
In the following, a passive scheme with a BS and a
photon-number-resolving (PNR) detector, which can discrim-
inate vacuum, one-photon, two-photon, and more than two-
photon states, is proposed to monitor the parameters needed
in Refs. [19, 20]. Then, the untrusted source in the plug-and-
Play QKD system can be monitored with the passive scheme.
Additionally, some practical issues due to finite-data size and
random-detection noise are included in the analysis. Further-
more, a proposed realization of the PNR detector is analyzed
based on the idea of the detector-decoy scheme [22].
II. KEY PARAMETERS IN SECURITY ANALYSIS
Generally, the secure key rate of the BB84 protocol is [2, 3]
R =
1
2
Q {∆1[1 − H2(e1)] − H2(E)} , (1)
where Q and E are, respectively, the count rate and the quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER) measured in the QKD experiment,
∆1 (e1) is the fraction of counts (QBER) due to the single-
photon state, and H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is
the binary Shannon entropy. In the standard security analysis
of the BB84 protocol, all the losses and errors are assumed
from the single-photon state [3], which gives
∆1 =
Q − Pmulti
Q , e1 =
E
∆1
, (2)
where Pmulti is the probability for Alice to send out multipho-
ton states.
2The decoy-state method offers a more effective way to
estimate the lower (upper) bound of ∆1 (e1) compared to
Eq. (2) [4–10]. In the three-intensity decoy-state protocol
[6, 9], Alice randomly sends three kinds of sources: vac-
uum, decoy, and signal sources, respectively. The quan-
tum state of the decoy (signal) source is ρd = ∑∞n=0 an |n〉 〈n|
(ρs = ∑∞n=0 a′n |n〉 〈n|). For a three-intensity decoy-state QKD
system with an untrusted source, it was proved that [19, 20]
∆s1 ≥
a′1
L
(
a′2
LQd − aU2 Qs − a′2LaU0 Q0 + aU2 a′0LQ0
)
Qs
(
aU1 a
′
2
L − a′1
LaU2
) , (3)
where Q0, Qd, or Qs is the count rate of vacuum, decoy, and
signal sources, respectively, and ∆s1 is the fraction of counts
due to the single-photon state in the signal source. To calcu-
late the lower bound of ∆s1, one needs to estimate the param-
eters {a′0
L
, aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 }, where the superscript L(U)
means lower (upper) bound. The secure key rate of the signal
source is
Rs =
1
2
Qs{∆s1[1 − H2(es1)] − H2(Es)}, (4)
where Es is the QBER from the signal source and es1 = Es/∆s1.
In the following, we present a passive scheme to estimate the
parameters {a′0
L
, aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 }.
III. THEORY OF ESTIMATION WITH PASSIVE SCHEME
The passive scheme for estimating the parameters {a′0
L
, aU0 ,
a′1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 } is shown in Fig. 1, where a PNR detector that
can discriminate the photon number of n = 0, n = 1, n = 2,
and n ≥ 3 is used. For simplicity, one can calibrate the setup
to satisfy
ηD(1 − ηBS ) = ηBS , (5)
where ηBS is the transmittance of the BS and ηD is the detec-
tion efficiency of the PNR detector. Under this condition, the
PND at P4 is the same as that at P3, where Pi means position
i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: (Color online) The untrusted source prepared at P1 by Eve,
where Pi means position i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), passes through an optical
filter, a phase randomizer (PR), and an attenuator (Att) with the at-
tenuation coefficient ηs (ηd) for the signal (decoy) source. After the
source is encoded, a BS with transmittance ηBS separates it into two
beams: One goes to a PNR detector with efficiency ηD at P3, and the
other is sent out from Alice’s side at P4.
A. PNR detector without detection noise
In the following, the PNR detector is assumed to be noise-
less. Suppose that Ps(d)(n4) denotes the PND for the signal
(decoy) source at P4, and Ds(d)(m) denote the PND for signal
(decoy) source at P3. Clearly, one has
an = Pd(n4 = n) = Dd(m = n),
a′n = P
s(n4 = n) = Ds(m = n), (6)
where n = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
Suppose that the data size N is the total number of optical
pulses sent from Alice to Bob, while N s(d) is the number of
signal (decoy) pulses, correspondingly. Let ks(d)m denote the
number of detected signal (decoy) pulses at P3 given that the
PNR detector records m photoelectrons (m = 0, 1, 2). Using
the random sampling theory [28], each Ds(m) ∈ [ksm/N s −
ε′, ksm/N s + ε′] with a confidence level 1 − 2 exp(−N sε′2/2)
for signal pulses, and each Dd(m) ∈ [kdm/Nd − ε, kdm/Nd + ε]
with a confidence level 1 − 2 exp(−Ndε2/2) for decoy pulses
can be estimated. For enough small exp(−N sε′2/2) and
exp(−Ndε2/2), simultaneously, Ds(m) ∈ [ksm/N s − ε′, ksm/N s +
ε′] and Dd(m) ∈ [kdm/Nd − ε, kdm/Nd + ε] for m = 0, 1, 2
are estimated approximately with a confidence level 1 −
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Simulation results of the three-intensity
decoy-state protocol for the trusted source with infinite-data size, and
for the untrusted source with: (a) finite-data size N = 109, 108, 107,
respectively, based on the passive PNR scheme in Fig. 1, where a BS
and a noiseless PNR detector are used to verify the parameters {a′0
L
,
aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 } with a confidence level 1 − 10−6; (b) finite-
data size N = 1016, 1014, 1012, 1010, 109, respectively, based on the
passive PNA scheme [15], where a BS and noiseless PNA are used
to verify the lower bound of the probability of untagged bits with a
confidence level 1 − 10−6 (see Appendix A).
36 exp(−N sε′2/2) − 6 exp(−Ndε2/2). From Eq. (6), one simul-
taneously gets
a′
L
m =
ksm
N s
− ε′, aUm =
kdm
Nd
+ ε, (m = 0, 1, 2) (7)
with a confidence level 1−6 exp(−N sε′2/2)−6 exp(−Ndε2/2).
For testing the effects of the finite-data size, we choose an
untrusted source of Poissonian statistics to perform simula-
tions based on the three-intensity decoy-state protocol. Fig-
ure 2(a) shows the numerical simulation results for the trusted
source, and the untrusted source with the passive PNR scheme
in Fig. 1, where a BS and a noiseless PNR detector are used to
verify the parameters {a′0
L
, aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 }. Here, the av-
erage photon number (APN) of the Poissonian source at P1 is
7.69×106. The attenuation ηs(d) is set to be 5×10−7(1×10−7),
and the transmittance of the BS is ηBS = 0.13 so that the APN
for the signal (decoy) state at P4 is µs = 0.5 (µd = 0.1).
The detection efficiency of the PNR detector ηD is set to be
0.15, so that Eq. (5) holds. The photoelectron detection data
recorded by the PNR detector is simulated using the Monte
Carlo method, and N = 107, 108, and 109 of measurements are
run. Other experimental parameters are cited from the GYS
experiment [29] as shown in Table I, where ηBob is the effi-
ciency of Bob’s detection, Y0 is the dark count rate of Bob’s
detector, and edet (e0) is the probability that a photon (dark
count) hits the erroneous detector on Bob’s side. To compare
the performance of the scheme in Fig. 1 with the passive PNA
scheme proposed in Ref. [15], where a BS with transmittance
ηBS and a noiseless PNA with efficiency ηD are used to verify
the probability of untagged bits (see Appendix A), Fig. 2(b)
shows the numerical simulation for the trusted source and the
untrusted source with the passive PNA scheme. All the ex-
perimental parameters are chosen to be the same as that for
Fig. 2(a).
B. PNR detector with additive detection noise
Given a PNR detector with an independent additive detec-
tion noise y, the detected photoelectron number m′, and the
photon number m at P3 satisfy m′ = m + y. One can calculate
the lower and upper bounds of PND D(m) (m = 0, 1, 2) at P3
based on the detected photoelectron distribution P(m′) , given
that the distribution of the detection noise N(y) is known by
Alice and independent of the input source. The dark count is
the main kind of detection noise for the PNR detectors, such
as the time multiplexing detector [30, 31], the transition-edge
sensor [32], or a threshold detector together with a variable
Att [22, 33]. In the case of independent Poissonian statis-
tics noise, the probability of detecting m′ photoelectrons is
P(m′) = ∑m′d=0 N(d)D(m′ − d), where N(y = d) = e−λλd/d! is
the probability that d dark counts occur in the PNR detector,
and λ is the average dark count rate. Then, one has

D(m = 0)
D(m = 1)
D(m = 2)
 =

P(m′ = 0) 0 0
P(m′ = 1) P(m′ = 0) 0
P(m′ = 2) P(m′ = 1) P(m′ = 0)


eλ
−eλλ
eλλ2/2
 .
(8)
Let ks(d)m′ denote the number of detected signal (decoy) pulses
by Alice at P3 given that the PNR detector records m′ pho-
toelectrons. Using the random-sampling theory [28], simul-
taneously, Ps(m′) ∈ [ksm′/N s − ε′, ksm′/N s + ε′] and Pd(m′) ∈
[kdm′/Nd − ε, kdm′/Nd + ε] for m′ = 0, 1, 2 are estimated with a
confidence level 1−6 exp(−N sε′2/2)−6 exp(−Ndε2/2). Com-
bining Eqs. (6) and (8), one yields
a′0 ≥ e
λ
(ks
m′=0
N s
− ε′
)
= a′0
L
,
a′1 ≥ −λe
λ
(ks
m′=0
N s
+ ε′
)
+ eλ
(ks
m′=1
N s
− ε′
)
= a′1
L
,
a′2 ≥
λ2
2
eλ
(ks
m′=0
N s
− ε′
)
− λeλ
(ks
m′=1
N s
+ ε′
)
+ eλ
(ks
m′=2
N s
− ε′
)
= a′2
L
,
a0 ≤ e
λ
k
d
m′=0
Nd
+ ε
 = aU0 ,
a1 ≤ −λe
λ
k
d
m′=0
Nd
− ε
 + eλ
k
d
m′=1
Nd
+ ε
 = aU1 ,
a2 ≤
λ2
2
eλ
k
d
m′=0
Nd
+ ε
 − λeλ
k
d
m′=1
Nd
− ε

+ eλ
k
d
m′=2
Nd
+ ε
 = aU2 (9)
with a confidence level 1−6 exp(−N sε′2/2)−6 exp(−Ndε2/2).
TABLE I: The simulation parameters for Figs. 2, 3 and 6.
ηD ηBS ηBob α Y0 edet e0
0.15 0.13 0.045 0.21 1.7 × 10−6 3.3% 0.5
For testing the effects of detection noise, we choose an un-
trusted source of Poissonian statistics to perform simulations
based on the three-intensity decoy-state protocol with the pas-
sive PNR scheme in Fig. 1. The untrusted source is of Poisso-
nian statistics with APN µ = 7.69×106 at P1, and the attenua-
tions ηs and ηd are set to be 5×10−7 and 1×10−7, respectively.
The other experimental parameters are cited from Table I. The
photoelectron detection and additive Poissonian noise of the
PNR detector are simulated using the Monte Carlo method,
and N = 108 and 109 of measurements are run for Figs. 3(a)
and 3(b), respectively. Our analysis is not limited to the Pois-
sonian noise case. Generally, when the random-positive de-
tection noise y with the probability N(y) is known to Alice,
one has

P(m′ = 0)
P(m′ = 1)
P(m′ = 2)
 =

D(m = 0) 0 0
D(m = 1) D(m = 0) 0
D(m = 2) D(m = 1) D(m = 0)


N(y = 0)
N(y = 1)
N(y = 2)
 .
(10)
4Thus, combining the results in Eqs. (6) and (10), one has
a′0 ≥
ks
m′=0/N
s − ε′
N(y = 0) ,
a′1 ≥
(
ks
m′=1/N
s − ε′
)
N(y = 0) −
(
ks
m′=0/N
s + ε′
)
N(y = 1)
N2(y = 0) ,
a′2 ≥
ks
m′=2/N
s − ε′
N(y = 0) −
ks
m′=1/N
s + ε′
N2(y = 0) N(y = 1)
+
ks
m′=0/N
s − ε′
N3(y = 0) N
2(y = 1) − k
s
m′=0/N
s + ε′
N2(y = 0) N(y = 2),
a0 ≤
kd
m′=0/N
d + ε
N(y = 0) ,
a1 ≤
(
kd
m′=1/N
d + ε
)
N(y = 0) −
(
kd
m′=0/N
d − ε
)
N(y = 1)
N2(y = 0) ,
a2 ≤
kd
m′=2/N
d + ε
N(y = 0) −
kd
m′=1/N
d − ε
N2(y = 0) N(y = 1)
+
kd
m′=0/N
d + ε
N3(y = 0) N
2(y = 1) − k
d
m′=0/N
d − ε
N2(y = 0) N(y = 2). (11)
Therefore, once the distribution of the detection noise is
known, the secure key rate can be estimated given the bounds
of {a′0
L
, aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 }.
IV. A PROPOSED REALIZATION OF A PNR DETECTOR
The PNR detector can be realized by a VOA (VOA) com-
bined with a practical threshold detector as shown in Fig. 4(a)
[22], which is equivalent to the model in Fig. 4(b). Sup-
pose that the state of input source is ρin =
∑∞
n=0 pn |n〉 〈n|.
In figure 4(b), after passing through an Att with efficient ηD,
the state of the source becomes ρ′ = ∑∞n=0 p′n |n〉 〈n| , where
p′n =
∑∞
m=n pm
(
m
n
)
ηnD(1 − ηD)m−n. When Eq. (5) holds, one
has
p′n
s
= a′n, p
′
n
d
= an. (12)
Then, the source passes through the VOA with efficiency η,
and the probability that the detector dose not click can be cal-
culated as p(η) = ∑∞n=0(1−η)n p′n [22]. When we take the dark
count of the threshold detector into account, it can be calcu-
lated as p(η) = (1 − λ)∑∞n=0(1 − η)n p′n, where λ is the dark
count rate of the detector. If Alice varies the transmittance of
the VOA η ∈ {η1, · · · , ηM}, she has a set of linear equations,
p(ηi) = (1 − λ)
∞∑
n=0
(1 − ηi)n p′n, (i = 1, · · · , M). (13)
When she employs an infinite number of possible transmit-
tance η ∈ [0, 1], she can always estimate any finite number of
probabilities p′n with arbitrary precision by solving Eqs. (13).
However, it is not necessary for our purpose in which we
are mainly concerned with the probability of vacuum, one-
photon, and two-photon states, and, thus, only three different
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Simulation result of the three-intensity decoy-
state QKD with an untrusted source based on the scheme in Fig. 1:
(a) The data size is N = 108, and the APN of the Poissonian noise in
the PNR detector is λ = 0, 10−6, 10−1, 0.5, 0.65, 0.78, respectively;
(b) the data size is N = 109, and the APN of the Poissonian noise in
the PNR detector is λ = 0, 10−6, 10−1, 1, 5, 5.16, respectively. The
experimental parameters are the same as in Table I. The confidence
level for both cases is 1 − 10−6.
FIG. 4: (Color online) (a) A threshold detector (modeled by an Att
with transmittance ηD and an ideal threshold detector) combined with
a VOA (transmittance: η) can realize a PNR detector [22]. (b) An
equivalent model to (a), which means the two models will produce
the same output given the same input.
transmittances η ∈ {η0, η1, η2} are needed [22]. One can
choose η0 = 1,
p(η0 = 1) = (1 − λ)p′0. (14)
Then one has
p(η1)
1 − λ
≥ p′0 + (1 − η1)p′1,
p(η1)
1 − λ
≤ p′0 + (1 − η1)p′1 + (1 − η1)2(1 − p′0 − p′1),
5from which one gets
p′1 ≤
p(η1) − p(η0)
(1 − λ)(1 − η1) = p
′
1, p
′
1 ≥
p(η1) − p(η0)[1 − (1 − η1)2] − (1 − λ)(1 − η1)2
(1 − λ)[1 − η1 − (1 − η1)2] = p
′
1. (15)
In a similar way, one has
p(η2)
1 − λ
≥ p′0 + (1 − η2)p′1 + (1 − η2)2 p′2 ≥ p′0 + (1 − η2)p′1 + (1 − η2)2 p′2
p(η2)
1 − λ
≤ p′0 + (1 − η2)p′1 + (1 − η2)2 p′2 + (1 − η2)3(p′3 + p′4 + p′5 + · · · )
≤ [1 − (1 − η2)3]p′0 + [1 − η2 − (1 − η2)3]p′1 + [(1 − η2)2 − (1 − η2)3]p′2 + (1 − η2)3,
from which the upper and lower bounds for p′2 can be estimated as
p′2 ≤
p(η2) − p(η0) − (1 − λ)(1 − η2)p′1
(1 − λ)(1 − η2)2 = p
′
2
p′2 ≥
p(η2) − [1 − (1 − η2)3]p(η0) − (1 − λ)[1 − η2 − (1 − η2)3]p′1 − (1 − λ)(1 − η2)3
(1 − λ)[(1 − η2)2 − (1 − η2)3]
= p′2. (16)
In conclusion, based on the recorded data {p(η0), p(η1),
p(η2)}, Alice can estimated the parameters {a′0L, aU0 , a′1L,
aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 } as in Eqs. (12) and (14)-(16). The scheme in
Fig. 4 can easily be realized with current technology. As for
the effect of statistical fluctuation, one can use the random-
sampling theory as before to consider the fluctuation of the
{p(η0), p(η1), p(η2)} with a confidence level so that we still
can bound {a′0
L
, aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 }.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results in Fig. 2 show that: (i) The performance of a
QKD system with an untrusted source is close to that of a
trusted source, when the source is monitored efficiently and
the data size is large enough; (ii) finite-data size has negative
effect on the secure key rate; (iii) the method in Ref. [15] is
more sensitive to statistical fluctuation and needs a larger data
size than the method proposed in this paper.
In the passive PNA scheme proposed in Ref. [15] (see Fig. 5
in Appendix A), Alice uses a PNA to monitor the probability
of the untagged bits in the untrusted source, after which, one
can estimate the lower bound of the secure key rate with a
confidence level as shown in Eq. (A1). When the confidence
level is set to be constant (e.g., 1 − 10−6), the estimation reso-
lution ε for the probability of untagged bits is only decided by
the data size N (ignoring the effect of detection noise), where
the confidence level is 1 − 2 exp(−Nε2/4) [15]. However, the
secure key rate in Ref. [15] is sensitive to the estimation reso-
lution ε, and will reduce greatly when ε increases (see Fig. 6
in Appendix A). When the data size N decreases, the resolu-
tion ε has to increase to keep the constant confidence level,
and, thus, the key rate will reduce.
While in the scheme shown in Fig. 1, Alice uses a PNR de-
tector to monitor the probability of vacuum, one-photon, and
two-photon states for the signal and decoy sources, respec-
tively. Because of the low intensity of the output pulses at P4
(e.g., µs = 0.5, µd = 0.1), the vacuum, one-photon, and two-
photon pulses are dominant in pulses, and Alice can gain most
of the information about the statistics of the untrusted source
at P4 based on the recorded data of the PNR detector. In our
scheme, six parameters are monitored, and more information
is gained than from the scheme in Ref. [15]. Mathematically,
the formulas shown by Eq. (4) are not so sensitive to the esti-
mation resolution of {a′0
L
, aU0 , a
′
1
L
, aU1 , a
′
2
L
, aU2 } compared to
that in Ref. [15] so that it does not require a very large data
size to work efficiently, as shown in Fig. 2(a). When the data
size is N ≥ 108, the performance of the scheme is very close
to that of the trusted source. In the asymptotic case where
Alice sends infinitely long bits of sequence (N ∼ ∞), the per-
formance will be the same as that of a trusted source as shown
in Appendix B.
The results in Fig. 3 show that: (i) Given a PNR detector
with the same dark count rate, the performance of a system
with an untrusted source will be better when the data size in-
creases; (ii) given the same data size, the performance of a
system with an untrusted source will reduce when the dark
count rate increases. The performance of the scheme in Fig. 1
is quite sensitive to the detection noise of the PNR detector.
It is shown that when the data size is N ≥ 108 and the dark
count rate of the PNR detector is λ ≤ 0.5 counts/pulse, which
are realizable by current techniques [30–33], this scheme can
still work efficiently.
In conclusion, we propose an experimental scheme to verify
6the key parameters needed in Refs. [19, 20]. The practical is-
sues due to detection noise and finite-data-size fluctuation are
analyzed. We also propose a realization of the PNR detector
based on the detector-decoy method, which is very practical
in real experiment. Therefore, the passive scheme with a PNR
detector is highly practical to solve the untrusted source prob-
lem in the two-way plug-and-play QKD system. This passive
scheme is also applicable to monitor the intensity fluctuation
in a one-way QKD system, where an active scheme has been
proposed and has been tested experimentally [26].
We remark that the effect of parameter fluctuations has
not yet been included in the security analysis. The effective
method to deal with the parameter fluctuations [19] is encour-
aged to be applied in the passive scheme.
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Appendix A: Passive scheme method in [15]
FIG. 5: (Color online) The model of the passive PNA scheme in
Ref. [14–16]. The untrusted source prepared by Eve passes through
an optical filter and a PR. Then, a BS with transmittance ηBS sepa-
rates it into two beams: One goes to a PNA with efficiency ηD, and
the other is attenuated by an Att with efficiency ηs(d) for the signal
(decoy) state and is encoded before being from sent out of Alice’s
side.
The passive PNA scheme in Ref. [15] is shown in Fig. 5.
For simplicity, one can set ηD(1 − ηBS ) = ηBS so that the PND
at position 2 is the same as that at position 3 in Fig. 5. Define
the pulses, whose photon number is M ∈ [Mmin, Mmax] at po-
sition 3, as untagged bits. A BS and a PNA are used to record
the frequency of untagged bits experimentally.
Suppose that N pulses are sent from Alice to Bob. Al-
ice and Bob do not know which bits are untagged bits. Let
Nuntagged denote the number of detected pulses by the PNA
when the recorded photoelectron number at position 2 belongs
to [Mmin, Mmax], and ∆ = Nuntagged/N. From the recorded data
in the PNA, one can estimate that at least (1 − ∆ − ε)N pulses
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Simulation result of the three-intensity decoy
state protocol for the trusted source and the untrusted source with
different estimation resolutions ε = 10−6, 10−5, 10−4, respectively.
Based on the passive PNA scheme in Fig. 5, a BS and a noiseless
PNA are used to verify the lower bound of the probability of un-
tagged bits. Experimental parameters are cited from Table I.
are untagged bits with a confidence 1 − 2 exp(−Nε2/4) where
ε is a small positive parameter [15].
Alice can measure the overall gain Qs(d) and the QBER
Es(d) for signal (decoy) pulses, respectively, while she does
not know the gain and the QBER for the untagged bits. The
upper and lower bounds of the gain of the untagged bits for
the signal (decoy) source can be estimated as
Qs(d) =
Qs(d)
1 − ∆ − ε
, Qs(d) = max
{
0,
Qs(d) − ∆ − ε
1 − ∆ − ε
}
.
The upper and lower bounds for the QBER of the untagged
bits can be estimated as
QsEs = QsEs1 − ∆ − ε, QsEs = max
{
0, QsEs − ∆ − ε
1 − ∆ − ε
}
,
for signal states, and
QdEd = QdEd1 − ∆ − ε , QdEd = max
{
0, QdEd − ∆ − ε
1 − ∆ − ε
}
,
for decoy states. For the untagged bits, one can show that
the upper and lower bounds of the probability that the output
photon number at position 4 is n for signal (decoy) pulses are
Ps(d)n =

(1 − ηs(d))Mmin n = 0,(
Mmax
n
)
ηn
s(d)(1 − ηs(d))Mmax−n 1 ≤ n ≤ Mmax,
0 n > Mmax,
Ps(d)n =

(
1 − ηs(d)
)Mmax n = 0,(
Mmin
n
)
ηn
s(d)(1 − ηs(d))Mmin−n 1 ≤ n ≤ Mmin,
0 n > Mmin,
under the condition Mmaxηs(d) < 1.
7When the lower bounds of the probability of the untagged
bits are known by Alice, the secure key rate for the three-
intensity decoy-state protocol with an untrusted source is [13]
R =
1
2
{
−QsH2(Es) + (1 − ∆ − ε)Qs1[1 − H2(es1)]
}
, (A1)
where
Qs1 =
Ps1
Pd1P
s
2 − P
s
1P
d
2
×
{
QdPs2 − QsPd2 + Ps0Pd2Q0−
Pd0P
s
2Q0 −
(Mmax − Mmin)(1 − ηd)Mmax−Mmin−1Ps2
[Mmin + 1]!
 ,
and
es1 =
EsQs − Ps0E0Q0
Qs1
.
For testing the effects of ε onto the secure key rate, we choose
an untrusted source of Poissonian statistics to perform the
simulations based on the three-intensity decoy-state protocol.
Suppose that the untrusted source has Poissonian PND with an
APN of 7.69 × 106 at position 1 of Fig. 5. Set ηs = 5 × 10−7,
and ηd = 1 × 10−7. The other experimental parameters are
chosen to be the same as in Table I. The values of Mmax and
Mmin are chosen to be constant. The results in Fig. 6 show that
the final key rate is very sensitive to the value of ε.
Suppose that Alice has a noiseless PNA, and the estimation
confidence level is set to be constant
1 − 2e−Nε2/4 = 1 − 10−6. (A2)
The estimation resolution ε is only decided by the data size
N. When the data size N decreases, the resolution ε has to
increase to keep the constant confidence level, and, thus, the
key rate will reduce greatly as shown in Fig. 2(b).
Appendix B: Asymptotic case of method in [19]
In the asymptotic case, Alice sends the infinitely long bits
sequence (N ∼ ∞). Therefore, one can consider ε, ε′ ∼ 0
in Eqs. (7), (9), or (11) while still having the confidence level
1. Suppose that the PND of the untrusted source is Poisso-
nian with an APN of µs(d) for the signal (decoy) source at P4
in Fig.1. One has
aU0 = e
−µd , aU1 = µde
−µd , aU2 =
µ2d
2
e−µd ,
a′0
L = e−µs , a′1
L
= µse
−µs , a′2
L
=
µ2s
2
e−µs .
Then, one can estimate
Qs1 = Qs∆s1 ≥
a′1
L
(
a′2
LQd − aU2 Qs − a′2LaU0 Q0 + aU2 a′0LQ0
)
aU1 a
′
2
L − a′1
LaU2
=
µs
µ2s − µsµd
Qde−µd − Qse−µs µ
2
d
µ2s
−
µ2s − µ
2
d
µ2s
Q0
 ,
which is exactly the same as the case for a trusted source.
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